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COAL TAXATION IN THE WESTERN STATES:
THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL TAX POLICY

Coal is the most abundant and potentially the most valuable mineral
energy resource of the United States. The decline in domestic crude
oil production, growing shortages of natural gas, and rising prices
and reduced availability of foreign oil all point to an increased reliance on coal as an energy source.1

More than half of the estimated identified coal resources remaining in the ground in the United States as of January 1, 1972, were
located in the ten states of the Western Governors' Energy Conference. 2 The coal in this region is the only low-sulfur strippable coal in
the United States? The purpose of this Comment is to encourage
these states to cooperate in the formation and implementation of a
regional tax policy for coal extraction. The goals of resource taxation
as they relate to coal and the theory of the taxation of coal will be
examined. Then a survey will be made of the taxes imposed on the
coal industry in these states. Last, a proposal will be made for a
regional coal taxation scheme which could result in Pareto
optimality' -the optimum condition for a comparative tax structure.
GOALS OF RESOURCE TAXATION

The most important goal of a regional tax policy should be to
assist each state in realizing its state tax goals. This will be a relatively
simple task if state tax goals are uniform. The search for uniform tax
1. Leistritz & Voelker, Coal Resource Ownership: Patterns,Problems, and Suggested
Solutions, 15 Nat. Res. J. 643 (1975). See also Habicht, The Northern Plains Coal Resource-Case Study in Public Nonpolicy, in Energy: Demand, Conservation, and Institutional Problems 249 (M. Macrakis ed. 1974).
2. Averitt, Coal, in United States Mineral Resources 133, 135, 137 (1973) (hereinafter
cited as Averitt). The ten states in the conference are Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming. There are no
coal resources located in Nebraska or Nevada. South Dakota's resources are negligible, and
there is no major mining. Therefore, those states will not be considered in this note.
3. Id. "Sulfur is an undesirable element in coal. It lowers the quality of coke and of the
resulting iron and steel products. It contributes to corrosion, to the formation of boiler
deposits, and to air pollution. Its presence in spoil banks inhibits the growth of vegetation.
As sulfuric acid, it is the main deleterious compound in acid mine waters, which contribute
to stream pollution." Id at 135.
4. Pareto optimality is a criterion of welfare economics, named after Vilfredo Pareto
(1848-1923), the Italian scientist who pioneered in developing the concept of economic
efficiency. Pareto optimality is more fully discussed under the Heading Optimum Tax.
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goals that would be acceptable to all states in the region is the
purpose of this section.
It seems fundamental that the most important goal of an extractive resources tax policy for any state should be to establish a tax
which will return maximum revenues to the state while not harming
the competitive position of its extractive industries.' Closely related
to this goal is the proper role of taxes in determining a proper
rate of
6
depletion in relation to the mining company's profitability.
A second important goal is providing for the general economic
development of the state.7 The most important contribution of mining firms (or any other firms) to the state's economy is not taxes but
jobs. One study in New Mexico indicated that every payroll dollar
spent in the state generated up to an additional five dollars in sales in
the local economy.' The state income and gross receipts taxes thereby generated provide far more state tax revenues than would a higher
tax rate on a given taxpayer or industry.' The mining firm also
creates jobs in support industries and businesses with its other
operating expenditures and capital investments.' 0 This is so important that it has even been suggested that there be a reduced tax rate
for firms which have low or negative net income.' 1 This would also
encourage the continued operation of firms which are encountering
marginal ore,' I that is, ore which is increasingly more costly to
extract. It would, of course, subsidize all marginal firms, thus including those that are simply not operated efficiently. At the least,
the state should not impose a tax which has the effect of making a
previously profitable (but marginal) firm unprofitable. 3
Some underlying considerations concerning these goals and the
taxation of extractive industries cannot be ignored. One is whether
5. Jones, The Struggle for Equitable Taxation of Mines-The New Mexico Example, 16
Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. 463, 478-79 (1971).
6. Vickrey, Economic Criteriafor Optimum Rates of Depletion, in Extractive Resources
and Taxation 315, 322 (M. Gaffney ed. 1967).
7. Jones, supra note 5, at 480-81.
8. Blumenfeld, A Preview of the Input-Output Study, 18 N.M. Bus. 18 (1965).
9. Bingaman, New Mexico's Effort at Rational Taxation ofHard MineralsExtraction, 10
Nat. Res. J. 415,421 (1970).
10. New Mexico Mining Association, PositionStatement, in Supp. No. 1 N.M. Legislative

Council Service, A Program for Tax Revision in New Mexico 291, 401 (1968).
11. Jones, supra note 5, at 481.
12. "The terms... paramarginal,and submarginaldesignate successively lower degrees of
economic recoverability; paramarginal resources are defined as low-grade resources that are
recoverable at prices as much as 1.5 times those prevailing now, and submarginal resources
are those of still lower grade." Brobts & Pratt, Introduction, in United States Mineral
Resources 3 (1973).

13. Comment, Approaches to State Taxation of the Mining Industry, 10 Nat. Res. J.
156, 169 (1970).
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mineral resources should be subjected to a heavier burden of taxation
than other real estate. A subsidiary question, for the purposes of this
note, is whether coal should bear a different burden of taxation than
other minerals. There are three principal theories for heavier taxation: (1) mineral resources are a natural heritage for the depletion
of which the state should be compensated;"4 (2) since mineral resources do not reproduce themselves, and thus diminish in value,
their extraction should be taxed more heavily;1 I and (3) the tax base
of the state is depleted as the resource is depleted and the extractive
industries should pay for this.' 6 Upon analysis, the arguments for
imposing heavier taxes on mineral resources are not altogether convincing. There may be some reasons, however, for imposing a different tax on coal than other mineral resources.
Certainly, mineral resources are a natural heritage but no more so
than surface land or, in a sense, human resources.' ' A tax should
have a neutral effect on the allocation of resources;' 8 that is, it
should not encourage the depletion of mineral resources at the expense of surface or any other resources. However, coal, as an energy
resource, may be sufficiently different from other non-energy
mineral resources to justify a different tax. A tax on coal must be
economically neutral with respect to other energy resources. It
should not encourage the conservation of coal at the expense of oil
or other energy resources. A simple illustration may help make the
point. Suppose that given the existing tax structure and an economy
with only two energy resources, coal and oil, the national annual
consumption of oil is 1,000 barrels, and of coal, 1,000 tons. If a tax
is imposed on oil extraction such that it is cheaper to extract less oil
than coal, resulting in the consumption of 800 barrels of oil and
1,500 tons of coal annually, the tax is non-neutral. One reason this
might occur is that it is more profitable to use coal gasification than
to pay the added tax on oil. The tax in this example causes a distortion of what would presumably be the optimum allocation.
It is also true that minerals are a wasting asset, that is, they do not
reproduce themselves. Conservationists formerly believed that present consumption should be reduced to preserve a stock of minerals
to be consumed in the future. High taxes are one method of dis14. Allen, Ad Valorem Versus Severance Taxation of Minerals, in Proceedings of the
Forty-Fifth Annual Conference on Taxation of the National Tax Association 574, 576

(1952).
15. Id.
16. Jones, supra note 5, at 466.
17. Allen, supra note 14.
18. Steele, Natural Resource Taxation: Resource Allocation and DistributionImplications, in Extractive Resources and Taxation 233 (M. Gaffney ed. 1967).
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couraging present consumption. Present thought, however, is that
because of the accelerated rate of technological advance in finding
non-wasting substitute resources, there is increasingly less reason for
conserving resources merely for the sake of having more minerals
underground at any given future date." 9 This would seem especially
true for energy resources such as coal because of the tremendous
amount of research being conducted in the utilization of non-wasting
energy resources. Contrary to the idea of taxing extractive firms
more heavily, it has even been suggested that some allowance be
made for them; since the quantity of unrecovered resources diminishes with extraction, profitability may also diminish."0
The state's tax base is depleted as its mineral resources are depleted. This is not of primary concern, however, for two reasons.
First, a conversion will probably have been made to non-wasting
energy resources long before coal resources are depleted. Second, the
revenues which are no longer being derived from the extraction of
coal can be derived from taxation of the production of the energy
resources which replace it.
Complete economic neutrality should be maintained at this time
between coal and other energy resources because of the present
energy crunch. Society, at this time, simply cannot afford the waste
associated with non-neutrality.
Thus, the tax imposed on coal should not be heavier than on any
other mineral resource unless this is necessary to maintain economic
neutrality between coal and other energy resources.
Another consideration is that state and municipal governments
have usually issued bonds on the basis of the revenues expected from
taxes.' 1 The contracts clause of the federal constitution 2 2 prohibits
a state from passing any law which will impair the obligation of
contracts. Statutes relating to raising revenue to pay state or municipal bonds which exist at the time the bonds are issued enter into and
become a part of the bond contract. 2" Thus, any state statute or
constitutional amendment -which reduces the tax rate 2 4 or changes
the basis or manner of assessment 2 5 so as to result in a revenue yield
19. Id at 248.
20. Allen, supra note 14.
21. Jones, supra note 5, at 483.
22. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
23. United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867). See cases
cited in Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1264, 1265 (1945).
24. United States ex rel. Gaines v. New Orleans, 17 F. 483 (CC 1883), rev'd on other
grounds, 131 U.S. 220 (1889). See cases cited in Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1264, 1272-73 (1945).
25. See cases cited in Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1264, 1275-77 (1945).
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that would be insufficient to pay the outstanding bonds is unconstitutional because it impairs the obligation of contracts.
Thus goals that would be best for any state are (1) to maximize
revenues without harming the competitive position of state industry;
(2) to promote the general economic development of the state; (3) to
ensure the economic neutrality of taxes between coal and all other
energy resources; and (4) to ensure that any change in the scheme of
taxes would not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts.
The only realistic hope for all states in the region to optimize
conditions under these goals (and thereby achieve Pareto optimality)
is to cooperate in establishing comparative tax structures. This concept seems to have already been grasped by the Western Governors'
Energy Conference. A policy statement noted "It has become
obvious to our ten western states that we must move in concert to
protect our citizens and our environment as we seek to provide our
share of energy for the nation in a situation where comprehensive
national energy policy is not fully stated or clearly defined." '2 6
Taxes in any one state that are substantially greater than those of
other states will cause valuable industries to move to states with
comparatively lower tax structures. Conversely, tax rates that are
lower than those of other states will create an unnecessary loss of
available revenues and will also result in earlier extraction than would
otherwise occur.2 7
The most efficient economy is one in which a state of Pareto
optimality exists. 28 Pareto optimality will be examined later in this
Comment. The important thing to note at this point is that Pareto
optimality can be achieved by either perfect competition or central
planning.2 9 Since perfect competition is an unrealistic assumption in
the coal industry, 3" achieving Pareto optimality will depend on cooperative planning among the states.
There is also an important environmental reason for cooperation.
26. Western Governors' Regional Energy Policy Office, Policies and Positions,July 29,
1975, at 2.
27. Jones, supra note 5, at 480.
28. R. Leftwich, The Price System and Resource Allocation 382 (5th ed. 1973); W.
Nicholson, Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application 481 (1975); 0. Herfimdahl &
A. Kneese, Economic Theory of Natural Resources 40 (1974).
29. Leftwich, supra note 28, at 393; Herfindahl & Kneese, supra note 28, at 45.
30. There are only a few sellers [See U.S. Dep't of Interior, 2 Minerals Yearbook 1972 at

92, 169, 437, 492, 532, 723, 804 (1974)]; absence of perfect knowledge; and significant
barriers to entry and exit in the industry because of high capitalization costs; See also
Habicht, The Northern Plains Coal Resource-Case Study in Public Nonpolicy, in Energy:
Demand, Conservation, and Institutional Problems 249 (M. Macrakis ed. 1974).
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Suppose that given the existing development of coal resources, one
state decides to impose an additional tax for the sole purpose of
environmental repair. This will have the same effect as any other
increase in taxes, penalizing the state that is environmentally responsible to the advantage of the states that are environmentally irresponsible. This could not happen if all the states acted in concert,
however, because the only source of low-sulfur, strippable coal lies
within this region. Coal mining operations may be induced to move if
the tax burden becomes too onerous. But they are limited by the
constraint that they can only move to another location with coal. 3 '
It should be noted that there may be some reasons for not creating
a regional tax policy. First, each state has its own taxing goals and
these may be totally irreconcilable-especially if they are noneconomic goals. Second, optimum efficiency might be better
achieved through competition among the states in the region rather
than through combination-essentially an oligopsony. Lastly, even if
a regional tax policy was deemed important, the mechanics of making it work are tremendously complicated. Initially, it would require
cooperation among seven governors and seven state legislatures.
Enormous amounts of capital would be needed to fund a regional
agency to research the problem and develop the sophisticated computer program that would be required to attain general equilibrium.
This writer, however, believes that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages.
THE THEORY OF THE TAXATION OF COAL
The title of this section should be qualified by noting that, regrettably, there is no such thing as the theory of the taxation of coal.
There is, in fact, no single, comprehensive statement of the theory or
theories of the taxation of natural resources in general or coal in
particular. 3 2 Nevertheless, there has been an abundance of work on
various aspects of the problem. 3 3 This section speaks in terms of
extraction and taxation of coal even though the concepts apply
equally to extraction and taxation of all mineral resources.
31. In the long run, of course, capital could leave coal mining entirely and move to
another endeavor. This seems totally unrealistic given the demand for coal resources today.
The market price of coal would surely be responsive enough to obviate the necessity of
abandoning coal mining all together; and as Lord Keynes said, in the long run we're all dead.
32. Extractive Resources and. Taxation xvii (M. Gaffney ed. 1967); 4 N.M. Legislative
Council Service, A Program for Tax Revision in New Mexico 9 (1968); Jones, supra note 5,
at 466. The field is ripe for a treatise on the subject.
33. See Extractive Resources and Taxation, supra note 32, and the references following
each essay.
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Federal taxes will not be considered because it is assumed that
these taxes will fall equally on all operations regardless of location. 3 4
Coal mining operations are subject to many of the state taxes to
which other business activity is subject, for example, the corporate
income tax, franchise taxes, sales and use taxes, unemployment insurance taxes and privilege or license taxes. Another section of this
Comment will survey these taxes in the states of this region. The
main emphasis of this section, however, will be on taxes peculiar to
coal or other mineral resources-either by their nature or application.
These taxes are property taxes, based upon the value of real and
personal property; and severance taxes, based upon either physical
units or value of production. There will also be a brief discussion of
three taxes that have been proposed for coal mining but are not
generally used-the net-income tax, the value-added tax, and the
royalty tax. In addition, brief mention will be made of the corporate
income tax because of its importance in some states. This section is
not intended to be a thorough economic analysis of the various taxes
but a survey of the literature.
Taxes affect the profitability of the mine and consequently the
rate of depletion. Because of this relationship it is necessary to have
some understanding of the theory of the mine.
The Theory of the Mine 3
It may generally be said that a mining company will extract only
those resources3 6 which it can profitably remove. The resources
which a company cannot profitably remove are said to be economically depleted or exhausted. In other words, the cost of extraction
has risen to the point at which none of the mineral product is demanded. 3 7 Those resources will not be extracted until they become
34. This is a simplifying assumption which may or may not be realistic depending upon
the tax skill of the firms under consideration.
35. This section is taken, except as otherwise noted, from Scott, The Theory ofthe Mine
Under Conditions of Certainty, in Extractive Resources and Taxation 25 (M. Gaffney ed.
1967).
36. "A fundamental concept in the evaluation of mineral resources is the distinction
between resources and reserves.... [T] he principal distinction is based on current economic availability: reserves are known, identified deposits of mineral-bearing rock from
which the mineral or minerals can be extracted profitably with existing technology and
under present economic conditions; whereas resources include not only reserves but also
other mineral deposits that may eventually become available-either known deposits that are
not economically or technologically recoverable at present, or unknown deposits, rich or
lean, that may be inferred to exist but have not yet been discovered." D. Brobst & W. Pratt,
supra note 12, at 1-2 (1973).
37. Herfindahl & Kneese, supra note 28, at 115.
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reserves, 3 that is, until changes in market price, technology or other
factors make extraction economically feasible.3 9
The theory of the mine starts with some simplifying assumptions,
some of which could later be relaxed. This section will not cover the
relaxation of the assumptions, since it is not necessary to a general
understanding of the theory of the mine.
The initial assumptions are (1) The coal reserves in the mine are
completely known; (2) The owner invests, borrows and lends at the
same rate of interest; (3) The owner's objective is to maximize the
present value of the coal mine in every period;4 (4) Profit can be
maximized in the short run only by adjusting the rate of extraction
(depletion), and in the long run by adjusting the capacity of the mine
[this note will not examine the long run effects of taxes]; and (5)
Conditions are constant through time. This latter assumption has
three aspects: the reserves are of a uniform grade throughout their
known total volume;" supply prices of all inputs, except the coal
itself, delivered to the mine and the selling price of all products f.o.b.
at the mine are given, fixed and unchanging through time, since the
mining company is always a price-taker; and the firm knows these
costs and prices with complete certainty.
Given these assumptions, a typical cost structure of a mining firm
is represented in Figure 1. If an owner were only given one period of
time within which to operate a mine, after which he would lose it
without scrap value or compensation, he would maximize his profits
by operating at point B, that is, where marginal cost (MC) equals
price (P). More realistically, since the owner knows the capacity of
his plant, the total amount of reserves, and the present and future
prices of his inputs and output, he will maximize profits by producing (extracting) at that rate at which his mining cost per ton
38.
39.
40.
ing to

See footnote 36 supra.
D. Brobst & W. Pratt, supra note 12, at 2 (1973).
"Under conditions of perfect competition an owner of an exhaustible resource wishmaximize the present value of profit per unit of his product will view price as a

function of time of the form ptp

oe

rt

where e-rt represents the discount factor which
determines present value of an amount to be obtained after time t assuming an interest rate
r. This indicates an indifference between receiving p

now or po er r after time t; that is, all

units of the mineral are assumed to be equally valuable at any time except for the changing
cost of placing them on the market." Hogan, Resource Exploitation and Optimum Tax
Policies: A Control Model Approach, in Extractive Resources and Taxation 91, 95 (M.
Gaffney ed. 1967).
41. "Coal is classified by rank according to the percentage of fixed carbon and heat
content, calculated on a mineral-matter-free-basis ....
It is quite independent of grade,
which is a way of expressing quality ....
Coal is classified by grade largely according to the
content of ash, sulfur, and other deleterious constituents." Averitt, supra note 2, at 134.
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extracted (AVC) is a minimum and his profit per ton is maximized at
point A.
Since the owner's objective is to maximize the present value of the
coal mine, all future profits must be discounted by the rate of interest. Thus, any rate of interest above zero will induce the owner to
shorten the life of the mine by increasing the rate of extraction per
period toward point B, the point of maximum profit per period.
Therefore, the rate of extraction chosen for all periods will lie between points A and B. Two general observations can be made: The
greater the rate of interest, the less attractive are remote profits, thus
the life of the mine will tend to be shorter, the annual rate of
extraction higher, and the mining costs per ton (AVC) higher; The
rate of extraction cannot exceed B, but if the interest rate is very
high, or the remaining life very long, it will come close to B. The
point chosen between points A and B may be designated the tentatively chosen rate of production, or t.c.r. The life of the mine is
equal to the total reserves divided by the t.c.r.
Any tax which affects the cost structure of the mine will have an
effect on the rate of extraction. 2 Refinements which can be made
to this model include relaxing the assumption of constant conditions
and introducing into the model the concept of the opportunity cost
of future foregone profit. The model can also be varied to account
for changes in wages, prices and costs and adjustments made for
long-run analysis.
There are, to be sure, other factors than the rate of extraction to
be considered in evaluating a tax. These include the sensitivity of the
tax to fluctuations in the business cycle, the ease of administration
of the tax, and the extent to which the tax can be exported from the
state or region.'I Very little has been published concerning these
factors.' They will be mentioned, however, in the discussion of the
various taxes.
Property Taxes
The property tax is usually imposed on the value of real and
personal property. Surface rights, improvements and mining equipment are relatively easy to valuate and are not substantially different
from other types of property upon which the tax is imposed. The
problem is in the valuation of coal reserves. Experts can seldom agree
42. Jones, supra note 5, at 468.

43. Church & Folsom, Optimum Taxatfion of Natural Resources by the State of New
Mexico (unpublished article on file with the Natural Resources Journal).
44. Id.
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on the value of coal reserves. Adding to the complexity is the requirement, found in most states, that these taxes be imposed with
uniformity and equality upon each class of property.' 5 This problem
is avoided in some states by either arbitrarily equating the value of
reserves to the value of minerals extracted in a calendar year or
substituting a net value of production in lieu of the value of reserves
in place.4 6 These are not true property taxes, however. The first is a
severance (production) tax and the second is a net income tax. A
closely related problem is that a tax based on the estimated value of
reserves may tend to distort the estimates of reserves which are
needed for national defense. Some mines "produce at capacity for
years from deposits that are continually reported to be nearly exhausted." 4 7
A property tax should tax the present discounted value of future
net receipts from the property. 4 8 Once a property tax based on the
present discounted value has been imposed, it will be to the mining
company's advantage to try to increase the present value over that
which was estimated in fixing the tax. This can be done by increasing
the rate of extraction. 4 9 The property tax will not change the shape
of the curves in Figure 1, but the process mentioned above would
work through the opportunity cost of future foregone profit, the
refinement mentioned above in connection with the description of
the model. Thus, the property tax tends to induce more rapid depletion of coal reserves.' 0
Property tax revenues are the least sensitive of all tax revenues to
fluctuations in the business cycle. This is because tax rates are determined by state and local needs and the tax base is established by
appraisals which are reestimated infrequently. 5 I
The property tax is difficult and costly to administer. Albert
Church and Roger Folsom studied many of the characteristics of
45. See, e.g., N.M. Const. art. 8, § 1.
46. Jones, supra note 5, at 471.

47. D. Brobst & W. Pratt, supra note 12, at 6 (1973).
48. Jones, supra note 5, at 470-71; Steele, supra note 18, at 245. The Hoskold formula is
a device frequently used to find the present value of future income from a given mine. It
also includes an allowance for repayment of the capital investment. One derivation of the
where r=to the amount of interest to be earned on a
Hoskold formula is PV- A
-

- +r'

Rr-1
sinking fund which will be used to repay the investor his original capital outlay when the
mine is exhausted; r' =speculative rate to purchases on the capital investment; n=life of the
mine in years; A-future net income; and R=l+r. Note, however, that the variables of this
formula are arbitrary and do not reduce the negotiating required between the parties.
49. Jones, supra note 5, at 470; Steele, supra note 18, at 245.
50. Jones, supra note 5, at 470; Steele, supra note 18, at 265.
51. Church & Folsom, supra note 43, at 13.
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taxes, including the property tax on natural resources.5 2 They rank
the property tax behind all but the royalty tax for difficulty of
administration.' I Most costly are making appraisals and the cost of
errors in appraisals. The recently revised New Mexico property tax
code ' is a good example of the administrative burden this tax
imposes.
The extent to which a tax can be exported from the state or
region is, as mentioned, an important factor. No matter how inefficient a given tax may be (for example, in the way it distorts consumption, investment or employment), it is of no concern to the
state or region if it is exported.5 I Exportability refers only to the
ability of a state or region to increase the price of coal (or other
resource) to the consumers. If most of the users are nonresidents, the
tax has been exported.5 6 In this regard, Church and Folsom rank the
property tax as likely to be on par with most other taxes, second
after severance taxes and better than a royalty tax.5 ' A tax will also
be exported to the extent it falls on the resource owner and that
resource owner is a nonresident.5 8 The manner in which a tax falls
on a person is called the "incidence" of the tax. The study of the
incidence of these taxes is beyond the scope of this note.
Severance (Production) Taxes
Severance taxes are usually imposed on the basis of units of production or on the gross value of production. This type of tax has also
been termed a privilege, excise, occupation or license tax.5 9 The tax
is usually imposed on the privilege of extracting or severing coal.
There are two types of severance taxes, specific and ad valorem.6"
Specific severance taxes impose a given dollar amount on each unit
extracted (usually tons). Ad valorem severance taxes are based on the
value of the resource extracted, usually expressed as a certain percentage of assessed value. Value may be measured by gross value,
52. Church & Folsom, supra note 43.

53. Id at 12.
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 72-28-1 et seq.; § § 72-29-1 et seq.; § § 72-30-I et seq.;
§ § 72-31-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975). Article 28 established the property tax department.
Article 29 established procedures for the valuation of property. Article 30 established the
tax rates and exemptions. Article 31 made provisions for the administration and enforcement of the property tax. These four articles are almost 100 pages in length.
55. Church & Folsom, supra note 43, at 6.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Id. at 12, 23.
58. Id. at 23.
59. Jones, supra note 5, at 471.
60. Allen, supra note 14, at 575.
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market value, gross yield, gross receipts or net proceeds. 6 1 The ad
valorem severance tax differs from the ad valorem property tax in
that the property tax is usually an annual levy based on the assessed
valuation of unrecovered coal whereas the severance tax is based on
the value of the coal actually extracted from the ground during a
specified period.
A specific severance tax will provide a small incentive to slow the
rate of extraction.6 2 An ad valorem severance tax also provides an
incentive to slow the rate of extraction and perhaps lower the total
level of recovery. 6 Under certain conditions, however, the severance
tax may become neutral with respect to the rate of extraction. If the
price of the resource increases over time at the rate of interest, and
the marginal cost of extraction also increases at this rate, the severance tax is neutral.6 If the tax rate increases
at a slower rate, it
6
slows the rate of extraction and vice versa. 1
A specific severance tax may also induce more rapid.depletion of
high grade ores with a concomitant abandonment of lower grade
ores6 6 because the profit margin is reduced or wiped out by the tax.
It would also discriminate against ores with relatively higher mining
costs (even though of the same grade) by inducing more intensive
mining of ores with lower extraction costs.6 7 Thus, the specific
severance tax could make a higher grade (or lower cost) ore economically exhausted or depleted. 6 8 An ad valorem severance tax will not
discriminate against lower grade ores although it will tend to encourage mining ores which, quality held constant, have lower mining
costs and will concomitantly discourage the mining of higher cost
6
ores.

9

A specific severance tax will tend to diminish the rate of extraction when market prices are down because the tax, fixed per ton of
coal, is relatively greater. The ad valorem tax will not have this
effect 7 because the valuation will vary with the market price. However, since ad valorem taxes reduce net income per unit of sales, they
will, like specific taxes, reduce output and raise prices when
shifted. 7
61. Id.
62. Church & Folsom, supra note 43, at 18.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Steele, supra note 18, at 246.
Id. at 246-47.

68. Jones, supra note 5, at 472.

69. Steele, supra note 18, at 246.
70. Id.

71. Id.
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The effect of a severance tax on rates of depletion or extraction
also depends on the anticipated future rates of the tax.
A tax that is on its face discriminatory and which singles out a
particular activity for special burdens is particularly likely to give
rise to fears of an increase, as distinct from broader taxes that if
increased will bear more or less evenly on a large body of tax payers,
and which accordingly will be increased only in terms of actual
needs for revenues... Ex ante, the fear of an increase seems likely
to outweigh the hope of a decrease in discriminatory or specific
taxes. 7 2
If the tax rate is expected to remain constant in the foreseeable
future, a specific severance tax will tend to induce a lower rate of
depletion because the present value of the tax declines as output is
deferred .73 An ad valorem severance tax based on a value including
some of the costs of extraction would have a similar effect.7 4
As mentioned above, severance taxes may be neutral with respect
to the rate of extraction. However, it should be noted that severance
taxes are naturally non-neutral with respect to the allocation of resources because the taxes discriminate against the taxed mineral by
raising its price relative to the prices of other minerals to the extent
that the tax can be passed on to the buyer in the form of a higher
price (which in turn depends on the elasticity of demand for coal).75
Thus, if a severance tax were imposed on coal, the same tax should
be imposed on all energy resources to maintain allocational neutrality.
Church and Folsom rank the specific severance tax third and the
ad valorem severance tax fourth in terms of sensitivity to business
cycles.' 6 They rate the specific severance tax first and the ad
valorem severance tax second in terms of administrative ease. 7 7 They
rank both severance taxes first in terms of exportability. 8 It should
also be noted that the exportability of the taxes increases as the
monopoly power of the mines increases. The entire region working
together might be able to export the entire tax-especially since so
much of the nation's coal resources are located in the region.7 9
72. Vickrey, supra note 6, at 323.
73. Id. at 322.
74. Id.
75. Steele, supra note 18, at 247.
76. Church & Folsom, supra note 43, at 12, 13.
77. Id. at 12, 14.
78. Id. at 12, 23.
79. Would exporting these taxes violate the commerce clause of the federal Constitution
if they were exported solely by means of an increase in the price of the resource? The State
taxation area of the commerce clause is a particularly esoteric field. A statement made by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter may be appropriate to this issue: "The power of the State to tax

April 19761

COAL TAXATION IN THE WESTERN STA TES

Net Income Taxes
Another type of tax usually levied in addition to any corporate or
personal income tax is based on the net value the mine company
receives for the extracted resources. Certain deductions are allowed
in order to derive a figure approaching net income. Deductions
usually include depreciation, depletion, and amortization costs.8 °
This type of tax usually has the least effect on the rate of extraction
because taxes approach zero when a company approaches its breakeven point. The
net income tax does not discourage development of
8
marginal ores.
The greatest disadvantage of this tax is its sensitivity to fluctuations in the business cycle. Any tax based on business profits will
be very sensitive to fluctuations in the business cycle because business profits are a function of businessmen's expectations and investment decisions, which in turn are based on income trends.8 2
Accordingly, Church and Folsom rank it behind severance taxes and
ahead of property taxes and royalty taxes.83 Church and Folsom
rank the exportability of net income taxes equal to property taxes
for the same reasons.8
Value-Added Taxes (VAT)
There has been some interest in using the value-added tax to tax
coal and other natural resources. There are two types of value-added
taxes, an income type and a consumption type. A value-added tax of
the income type uses as the tax base total revenue less cost of materials and depreciation. A value-added tax of the consumption type
uses as the tax base total revenue less cost of materials and purchases
of new depreciable assets (but not depreciation). 8
The interest generated by the VAT stems from the belief that it is
economically neutral. According to a study done by Steele, however,
the neutrality of either type of VAT will depend on the extent to
which it can be passed on to the consumer. Thus, while the VAT is
and the limitations upon that power imposed by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a
long, continuous process of judicial adjustment. The history of this problem is spread over
hundreds of volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the
past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future. Suffice it to say that
especially in this field opinions must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as the
product of preoccupation with their special facts." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
80. Jones, supra note 5, at 472.
81. Id.
82. Church & Folsom, supra note 43, at 13.
83. Id. at 12, 14.
84. Id. at 12, 13.
85. Steele, supra note 18, at 255.
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initially neutral, the process of shifting causes it to become nonneutral." 6
Concerning sensitivity to business cycle fluctuations, Church and
Folsom rank the VAT and severance taxes third for the same
reasons.8 They consider only the property tax and the royalty tax
more difficult to administer.' I The VAT and severance taxes are
both ranked first in exportability for the same reasons.8 9
The Royalty Tax
Very little has been written about taxes on royalties paid to the
owners of property rights in natural resources. A royalty tax falling
on resource owners would be neutral with respect to the rate of
extraction. 0
Royalty taxes are ranked second in sensitivity to business cycle
fluctuations. 9 1 Church and Folsom consider the royalty tax the
most difficult tax to administer. 9 2 While taxes on royalties paid to
private owners would be relatively simple to administer, taxes on
royalties paid to the firms who actually do the extracting would be
difficult to administer because an estimate would have to be made of
the amount of royalty that the mining firm as extractor is paying to
itself as owner. The royalty tax is ranked last in terms of exportability. 9 3 This tax can be exported only to the extent the recipients
of royalties are non-residents.
Another difficulty would seem to be in those situations in which
the resource owner is the local, state or federal government or an
Indian tribe. Can the state "pay" taxes on royalties to itself? Does
the state have authority to tax royalties paid to the federal government or Indians? 94
Income Taxes
Income taxes are in no way peculiar to the taxation of coal, but it
86. Id. at 256-64.
87. Church & Folsom, supra note 43, at 12, 13.
88. Id. at 12, 14.
89. Id. at 12, 23.
90. Id. at 17.
91. Id. at 12, 13.
92. Id. at 12, 14.
93. Id. at 12, 23.
94. The federal constitution implies that all properties, functions, and instrumentalities
of the federal government are immune from state and local taxation. Smith v. Davis 323
U.S. 111 (1944). Concerning the taxation of Indian lands, See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Texas Co., 336 U.S, 342 (1949), Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928);
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization of Tulsa County, 288 U.S.
325 (1933).
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seems necessary to treat them here because of increased reliance on
the income tax at the state level.
Flat rate corporation income taxes, by far the most common type,
discriminate against unusually risky and capital intensive industries,
which includes most of the coal mining industry.9"
If a flat rate corporation income tax is passed on to the consumer
in full, the riskier and more capital intensive industries will be forced
to raise their prices relatively more than other industries because
their tax base is a larger percentage of their sales price. This will
cause a reallocation of resources to the other industries.9 6 This disadvantage can be partly overcome by granting mineral industries
special deductions, such as the depletion allowance, but it will not
approach true neutrality unless each case is handled separately. 9
The Optimum Tax
The purpose of this section, up to this point, has been to survey
the many taxes that can be imposed on the extraction of coal. Many
advantages and disadvantages have been discussed. But the question
remains, which tax is best? One tax might be favored over another
because it more nearly accomplishes a particular goal that has been
considered important, or a particular tax might be favored because it
has a tendency to fall on someone else.
The selection of an optimum tax comes under the particular
branch of economics referred to as "welfare economics." Welfare
economics is concerned with achieving optimum welfare for the
economy as a whole. Welfare economics can be used to determine
whether a given exchange should take place or whether a certain tax
is good or bad. 9
The theory of welfare economics is not only a positive theory
which describes the working of an economy, but also a normative9 9
theory which can be used for policy considerations. Whether a thing
is good or bad depends on value judgments. Thus, welfare economics
deals implicitly with value judgments.
The concept of Pareto optimality is one tool used by welfare
economics to achieve efficiency. While Pareto optimality and its uses
95. Steele, supra note 18, at 256.
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id. at 254.
98. Herfindahl & Kneese, supra note 28, at 41.
99. "Positive economics seeks to determine how resources are in fact allocated in an
economy. A somewhat different use of economic theory is for normative analysis. Such
analysis takes a definite moral position on what should be done. Under the heading of
normative analysis, economists have a great deal to say about how resources should be
allocated." Nicholson, supra note 28, at 7.
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can become very complex, the underlying value judgments are simple
and will provide an adequate foundation in the concept. One value
judgment implicit in all welfare economics, and which lies behind the
purpose of using Pareto optimality, is that "sheer waste and malfunctioning must damage everyone and can be to nobody's advantage."' 00° Society searches for a concept such as Pareto optimality
because it does not want to waste anything. Additionally, there are
two basic value judgments on which welfare economics and Pareto
optimality are based:' 0 1 (1) The individual's preferences are important so that a person is better or worse off only if he feels that way;
and (2) A change that makes everybody better off means an increase
in the total social welfare. A situation in which no one can be made
better off without at least one person being made worse off is called
a Pareto optimum. In the context of this note, Pareto optimality
means finding a regional tax policy which will result in a tax to be
used by all the states such that no change could occur to make one
state better off without hurting the other states.
The use of Pareto optimality in the search for the optimum tax
will be touched upon again later in this discussion. Before leaving the
theory portion of this note, however, it may be useful to look at what
Pareto optimality cannot do. Pareto optimality, although it states a
necessary condition that must be met in any state of a society if that
state is to be considered optimal, offers no one criterion for judging
among an infinite set of different positions among the members of
society.! 02 There are a number of different end results which can be
obtained from any given economic state, all of which could be Pareto
optimal' 03 Thus, the Pareto optimality criterion is useful in generating policy recommendations only if it can be combined with
some policy device which reduces the number of possible Pareto
positions.' 04
STATE TAXES IMPOSED ON COAL

The tax laws of the various states with large extractive industries are
a welter of complicated, inconsistent and overlapping provisions.' 0 5
It is important to be able to predict the influence of taxes on the
behavior of the coal mining company and, consequently, on such
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

(1968).

V. Walsh, Introduction to Contemporary Microeconomics 107 (1970).
Herfindahl & Kneese, supra note 28, at 41.
Walsh, supra note 101, at 111.
Economists call this "the contract curve."
Walsh, supra note 101, at 111.
4 N.M. Legislative Council Service, A Program for Tax Revision in New Mexico 9
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things as the rate of depletion and ultimately state revenues. There is,
unfortunately, no means of predicting the influence of taxes on the
behavior of the coal mining company by examining the statutes of
any state. This is partly because there are so many taxes to which
coal mining companies are subject. (Schedule "A" summarizes the
many taxes imposed by states which affect coal mining). Another
cause is that there is not a given statutory rate for some taxes nor a
uniform system of valuation among the states. For example, in New
Mexico, the property tax is assessed at different rates from one taxing district to another, depending on need1 06 and subject to the
constitutional maximum of 20 mills on each dollar of assessed valuation. ' 7 The valuation problem is demonstrated by New Mexico and
Arizona. Arizona values property at percentages ranging from 15 to
60 per cent, depending on class, whereas New Mexico values all
property at 33 1/3 per cent of market value. One effort to penetrate
this quagmire is the work of Professors Gerald Boyle and Albert
Church of the University of New Mexico. When completed next year,
this project will detail an optimal tax policy and present a survey of
taxes actually imposed on minerals in New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and Utah.
An examination of Schedule B and Figure 2 shows that the states
are not dependent on the same type of taxes. For example, 48 per
cent of all Montana revenues are derived from income taxes while
Wyoming does not impose any tax on income.
Even a cursory examination of Schedules A and B and Figure 2
should indicate that no one can be sure what effect current taxes
have on coal mining or whether any given state is even approaching
an optimum tax policy. It is, in fact, indicative that none of these
states has a tax policy pertaining to coal.
SCHEDULE "A"
ARIZONA
1. Corporate organization, qualification & annual registration fees-Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 10-104,-481,-211 (Supp. 1975).
2. Corporate Income Tax-§ 43-102(b) (1956, Supp. 1975-76).
3. Property Tax-§ 42-201 et seq. (1956, Supp. 1975-76).
4. Fuel Use Tax-§ 28-1552 et se. (Supp. 1975-76).
5. Motor Vehicle Registration Fees-§§ 28-205, -206, -1591 (Supp.
1975-76).
6. Occupation (Privilege) Tax-§ § 42-1309 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76).
106. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-30-6, -7; § 72-31-33 (Supp. 1975). All of the states in the
region have similar provisions.
107. N.M. Const. art. 8, § 2.
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Composition of State Revenues

s.

AZ

CO-

:

.

.

-.

MN

NM

ND

WY

,

............

KEY

Individual Income Tax

-Corporate
-

Z Z"

Property Tax

Sales and Use Tax

IDirect

L iii

Income Tax

Taxes on Mining

Other Revenues

April 19761

COAL TAXATION IN THE WESTERN STATES

7. Use Tax-§§ 42-1401 et seq. (1956, Supp. 1975-76).
8. Special Education Excise Tax-§ § 42-1371 et seq. (1956, Supp. 1975-76).
9. Unemployment Insurance Contributions-§§ 23-721 et seq. (1956, Supp.
1975-76).
COLORADO
1. Corporate organization and qualification fees-Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 7-10-101 et seq. (1973).
2. Corporate Franchise Tax-§ 7-10-106 (1973).
3. Corporate Income Tax-§§ 39-22-301 (1973, Supp. 1975).
4. Property Tax-§§ 39-1-101 et seq. (1973, Supp. 1975).
5. Motor Fuel Tax-§§ 39-27-102 (1973, Supp. 1975).
6. Coal Tonnage Tax-§ § 34-23-101, -102 (1973).
7. Motor Vehicle Registration Fees-§§ 42-3-123(4), -(5), & -(13);
§§ 42-3-105, -106 & -108 (1973, Supp. 1975).
8. Sales and Use Tax-§ § 39-26-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
9. Unemployment Insurance Contributions-§ § 8-76-101 et seq. (1973).
MONTANA
1. Corporate organization and qualification fees-Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.
§ § 15-22-120 et seq. (1947, Supp. 1975).
2. Annual Report Fee-§§ 15-22-119,-121 (1947, Supp. 1975).
3. Corporation License (Income) Tax-§ 84-1501 (1947, Supp. 1975).
4. Motor Vehicle Taxes-§ § 53-114, -122, -129; § § 32-3301 et seq. (1947,
Supp. 1975).
5. Property Tax-§ § 84-201 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
6. Coal Severance Tax-§ § 84-1312 et seq. (Supp. 1975). Replaces Strip
Mining Tax.
7. Coal Strip Mining Tax-(Changed to Coal Severance Tax).
8. Mineral Mining Tax-§ § 84-5401 et seq. (1947, Supp. 1975).
9. Motor Vehicle Registration Fees-§ 53-122 (Supp. 1975).
10. Unemployment Insurance Contributions-§ 87-109 (Supp. 1975).
NEW MEXICO
1. Corporate organization and qualification fees-N.M. Stat. Ann. § 51-12-1
(Supp. 1975).
2. Franchise Tax & Annual Report Filing Fee-§§ 51-13-1 et seq.;
§§ 51-21-1 et seq.; §§ 51-12-1 et seq. (Repl. 1962, Supp. 1975).
3. Corporate Income Tax-§§ 72-1SA-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
4. Property Tax-§ § 72-30-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
5. Gasoline Tax; Special Fuel Tax-§ 72-27-3 (Repl. 1961); §§ 64-26-66 et
seq. (Repl. 1972, Supp. 1975).
6. Natural Resources Excise Tax-§ § 72-16A-20 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
7. Severance Tax-§§ 72-18-1 et seq. (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1975).
8. Motor Vehicle Registration Fees-§ § 64-3-1 et seq.; § 64-34-14.1 (Repl.
1972, Supp. 1975).
9. Motor Vehicle Excise Tax & Use Fee-§§ 64-11-15 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
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10. Gross Receipts & Compensating Tax-§ § 72-16A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
11. Unemployment Insurance Contributions-§ § 59-9-7 et seq. (Repl. 1974,
Supp. 1975).
NORTH DAKOTA
1. Corporate organization and qualification fees; annual report fee-N.D.
Cent. Code § § 10-23-02, -04, -05, -06 & -07 (1960, Supp. 1975).
2. Corporate Income Tax-§ § 57-38-11, -30 (Repl. 1972).
3. Property Tax-§ 57-02-03 (Repl. 1972).
4. Gasoline Tax; Special Fuels Tax-§ 57-54-08; § 57-50-01; § 57-52-01
(Repl. 1972).
5. Coal Severance Tax-§ 57-61-01 (Supp. 1975).
6. Motor Vehicle Registration Fees-§ § 39-04-14, -14.1 & -19 (Repl. 1972,
Supp. 1975).
7. Motor Vehicle Excise Tax-§ § 57-40.3-02, -03 (Repl. 1972).
8. Sales and Use Tax-§ § 57-39.2-02, -03; § § 57-40.2-02, -03 (Repl. 1972,
Supp. 1975).
9. Unemployment Insurance Contributions-§ § 52-04-01 et seq. (Repl.
1974, Supp. 1975).
UTAH
1. Corporate organization and qualification fees-Utah Code Ann.
§ § 16-10-123 to -127 (Repl. 1972, Supp. 1975).
2. Individual Income Tax-§ § 59-14-1 et seq. (Repl. 1973, Supp. 1975).
3. Corporate Franchise (Income) Tax-§ § 59-13-1 et seq. (Repl. 1973, Supp.
1975).
4. Sales Tax-§ § 59-15-1 et seq. (Repl. 1973, Supp. 1975).
5. Use Tax-§§ 59-16-1 et seq. (Repl. 1973, Supp. 1975).
6. Local Sales & Use Tax-§§ 11-9-1 et seq. (Repl. 1972, Supp. 1975).
7. Property Tax-§ § 59-5-1 et seq. (Repl. 1973, Supp. 1975).
8. Motor Vehicle Registration Fees-§ § 41-1-127 to -130 (Repl. 1970, Supp.
1975).
9. Unemployment Insurance Contributions- § § 35-4-7 et seq. (Repl. 1974).
WYOMING
1. Corporate organization & qualification fees-Wyo. Stat. Ann. § § 17-36.
114, -115 (1957, Supp. 1975).
2. Property Tax-§ 39-82 (1957, Supp. 1975).
3. Gasoline Tax-§ § 39-183 to 204.8 (1957, Supp. 1975).
4. Mining Excise Tax-§ 39-227.1:1 (Supp. 1975).
5. Coal Severance Tax-§ 39-227.1 (Supp. 1975).
6. Sales Tax-§ § 39-286 et seq. (1957, Supp. 1975).
7. Use Tax-§§ 39-310 et seq. (1957, Supp. 1975).
8. Unemployment Insurance Contributions-§ 27-28 (Supp. 1975).
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SCHEDULE B
State Taxes Affecting Mining
ARIZONA-FY 1974-75 (TR $754,879,497)
1. Individual Income & Withholding
2. Corporate Income
3. Property
4. Sales and Use'

$172,931,444
50,753,043
75,354,418
397,866,869'

22.91%
6.72
9.98
52.71
92.32

ITotal of Sales Tax, Education Excise Tax, Special Education Tax, Use Tax, Bingo Tax
and Rental Occupancy Tax.
Statistics courtesy of Neal G. Trasente, Director, Arizona Dept. of Revenue (letter on file
with NRJ) and Annual Report, Dept. of Revenue, 1974-75.
COLORADO-FY 1975 (TR $1,573,251,779)'
1. Individual Income
2. Corporate2 Income
3. Property
3
4. Sales, Use,4 Excise & Gross Receipts
5. Severance

$261,762,211
48,755,885
614,9000002
398,140,6773
2,314,4624

16.64%
3.10
39.08
25.31
0.15
84.13

I FY 1975 Revenues of $958,351,779 plus property tax collected in 1975 of
$614,900,000.
2Property Taxes are assessed, collected and remain at the local level and are consequently
not strictly considered "state" revenues.
3
4 Coal mines paid $39,728 in sales taxes while all mines paid $729,000 in sales taxes.
The severance tax is collected on oil and gas property valuation.
Statistics courtesy of Tom Dunn, Statistical Analyst, Colorado Dept. of Revenue (letter
on file with NRJ).
MONTANA-FY 1974-75' (TR $230,678,002)
1. Individual Income
2. Corporate License (Income)
3. Property 2
4. Strip Mines License Tax 3
5. Metalliferous Mines License Tax
6. Micaceous Mineral Mines License Tax 4

$ 88,662,627
22,078,645
6,974,7862
5,395,4153
3,099,368
10,124

38.44%
9.57
3.02
2.34
1.34
0.01
54.72

IIn addition to the taxes listed, the mining industry pays a substantial amount of local
property tax as well as a resource indemnity trust tax. The proceeds from the resource
indemnity trust tax go into a trust fund, the interest of which will be used to repair
environmental damage caused by mining activity. About $500,000 was collected from the
mining industry for this tax in FY 1974-75.
2The property tax supports the state university system. Nearly 95% of all property tax
collected stays at the local level. There is presently no way of knowing precisely how much
of the state-wide property tax is paid by the mining industry without a detailed investigation in each of Montana's 56 counties. A reasonable estimate would be that the mining
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industry pays 4% to 5% of the tax and that the coal industry pays about half of that. The
reason that an accurate estimate cannot be made is because the value of the real and
personal property of mining interests is mingled on the tax rolls with the value of the
property of all other taxpayers.
'As of July 1, 1975, this was changed to the Coal Severance Tax and the rate was raised
considerably. Under the new law it is expected that revenues for the current fiscal year will
be 4about $20 million.
The total mineral mining tax (strip + metal + micaceous) = $8,504,907 (3.69%).
Statistics and estimates courtesy of John M. Clark, Administrator, Research Division,
Montana Dept. of Revenue (letter on file with NRJ).

NEW
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

MEXICO-FY 1974-75 (TR $453,564,000) 1
Individual Income & Withholding
$ 56,575,000
Corporate & Banking
18,344,000
Property
10,966,000
Gross Receipts & Compensating Tax 2
173,260,0002
2,964,0003
Natural Resources Excise Tax 3
4
37,896,0004
Severance Tax

12.47%
4.04
2.42
38.20
0.65
8.36
57.86

'General Fund total revenue of $415,668,000 plus severance tax revenues of
$37,896,000.
'Approximately $1,700,000 was collected from the coal mining industry.
' Approximately $348,859 was collected from the coal mining industry.*
'Approximately $198,320 was collected from the coal mining industry. This is not
included in the general fund.*
*Courtesy of William F. Darmitzel, Executive Director of the New Mexico Mining Association.
Statistics courtesy of Janet Atwood, Economist, Dept. of Finance and Administration
(letter on file with NRJ).

NORTH DAKOTA-FY 1975 (TR $353,386,019)
1. Individual Income & Withholding
$ 70,735,193
2. Corporate Income
8,627,145
3. Property'
119,619,804'
4. Sales & Use2
82,360,6372

20.02%
2.44
33.85
23.31
79.62

'Collected by counties.
'The Coal Severance Tax, enacted July 1, 1975, replaces the sales tax on coal. There was
an estimated $518,283 sales tax collected on coal sales in FY 1975. For the first three
months of FY 1976 (July, August & September of 1975) there was $1,165,159 collected on
the coal severance tax.
Statistics courtesy of C. William Cudworth, Research Analyst, Office of North Dakota
State Tax Commissioner (letter on file with NRJ) and 32d Biennial Report of the Tax
Commissioner of North Dakota.
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UTAH-FY 1974 (TR $540,725,207)'
1. Individual Income Tax
2. Corporation Franchise & Income
3. Sales & Use Tax
4. Local Sales &2Use Taxes
5. Property Tax

$ 90,032,358
20,173,183
149,442,237
19,036,945
170,641,107

16.65%
3.73
27.64
3.52
31.56
51.85

'Total State Taxes of $350,478,291 plus local Sales & Use Taxes of $19,036,945 plus
1973 property taxes of $170,641,107 which remain at the local level.
2 1973 Property Taxes, not usually considered a "state" revenue.
Statistics from Twenty-second Biennial Report of the Utah State Tax Commission.

WYOMING-FY 1975 (TR $374,478,952)'
1. Property Tax
Tax 2
2. Mining Excise
3
3. Sales Tax
Tax
4. Coal Severance
4
5. Use Tax

$131,082,890
2,507,5502
60,358,0913
2,826,335
12,870,9704

35.00%
0.67
16.12
0.75
3.44
52.57

'State Revenues of $243,396,062 plus $131,082,890 in property taxes which normally
remain at the local level and are not strictly considered "state" revenues.
2 $764,611 was collected from coal mining.
2

$84,439 was collected from coal mining.

' $680,171 was collected from coal mining.

Statistics courtesy of James E. Petry, Director of Revenue (letter on file with NRJ) and
Harold DeBolt, Ad Valorem Dept (by phone).

A PROPOSAL FOR A REGIONAL COAL TAX POLICY
The overview of the taxes on coal mining in the various states
presented in the foregoing section shows that it is unrealistic to
expect to know for certain how taxes affect coal mining in these
states. Yet it has been shown that this is an important objectiveotherwise revenues may be needlessly foregone or resources inefficiently depleted. The only reasonable solution is to substitute one
single tax on coal mining for the maze of taxes in each state.
The first question which might be asked is what type of tax should
be imposed? The second section of this Comment detailed the
present types of taxes imposed and discussed their advantages and
disadvantages. Based on that information, this writer would suggest a
type of severance tax based on BTUs per ton extracted.
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The Western Governors' Regional Energy Police Office recently
said:
Coal, as a source of energy, has a market value based on many
factors, including BTUs per pound, water content, distance to market, etc. Tax policy should reflect these and additional factors.
WGREPO is directed to investigate these and additional factors.
WGREPO is directed to investigate and report on tax programs and
policies in western states that are applicable to coal production.' 08
One advantage of this type of tax over the conventional severance
taxes discussed above is that it forces those who would use coal for
other than energy uses to count the opportunity cost of doing so,
namely, foregone BTUs represented by the amount of tax paid.
Coal generally ranges from 24 million to 28 million BTUs per
ton.1 09 A state such as New Mexico, which has a state geologist,
could have that office certify the BTUs based on samples sent from
the mine. Should there be doubt among experts as to the number of
BTUs in a given grade of coal, the legislature could arbitrarily set it
for taxation purposes.
The use of this tax as the only tax on coal mining in the region
would enable a regional agency to establish a computer program
which could define a Pareto optimum for the taxation of coal in the
region. Additionally, this vehicle could be used for all energy resources, thus establishing a Pareto optimum in the region among
energy resources.
Certainly, it would be easier to establish a Pareto optimum with
any one tax rather than with the multitude of taxes now being used.
A careful analysis of the needs of the states in the region might show
that some other tax than the one proposed here would be better. The
program will most assuredly not work, however, unless the multitude
of taxes imposed on coal mining now are removed and replaced with
one tax.
The tax goals discussed earlier in this Comment would have to be
examined by each state and formally adopted. The regional agency
proposed by this note would then be charged with responsibility for
assigning mathematical values to the goals of each state so that an
indifference curve1 1 can be developed for each state. The regional
108. Western Governors' Regional Energy Policy Office, Tasks and Projects to be undertaken by WGREPO, July 29, 1975.
109. N. McNerney, Energy Reference Handbook 253 (1974).
110. Indifference curves are used to determine the Pareto optimum. A person's (or
state's) preferences are geometrically illustrated by an indifference curve. The points on the
curve show choices between which the person (or state) is indifferent.
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agency would then present several Pareto optimums which result
from the data and would make recommendations about the various
possible optimums. From this process would emerge an optimum tax
which would increase the welfare of all of the states in the region.

CONCLUSION
The most important goal of a regional tax policy should be to
assist each state in realizing its state tax goals. This is a relatively
simple task if state tax goals are uniform. The goals which would be
best for any state and would thus form the basis of a uniform regional tax policy are (1) to maximize revenues without harming the
competitive position of state industry; (2) to promote the general
economic development of the state; (3) to ensure economic neutrality of taxes between coal and all other energy resources; and (4) to
ensure that any change in the scheme of taxes would not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts.
There is no conceivable way that a state in this region can presently determine the effect its taxes have on coal mining within the
state because of the complex of taxes imposed at various administrative and political levels. Because of this a state may be unknowingly
foregoing valuable revenues or discouraging development of its resources. The multitude of taxes on coal found in each state is further
indicative that no state in this region has a tax policy pertaining to
coal.
The only reasonable solution to this problem is to remove all taxes
from coal except one. The one tax used to replace the removed taxes
should be chosen on the basis of careful analysis made by a regional
planning agency of the needs and tax goals of each state in the
region.
This Comment suggests a severance tax based on BTUs because
coal is assumed to be more important to society at this time as an
energy resource than in any of its non-energy uses. A tax on BTUs,
among other things, forces those who would use coal for other than
energy uses to count the opportunity cost of doing so, namely, foregone BTUs represented by the amount of tax paid. Additionally, that
tax would have the other advantages of a severance tax, such as
administrative ease, exportability and relative stability in relation to
business cycle fluctuations.
Unless all states in the region cooperate, competition among the
states may interfere with pursuing an optimum tax policy. Coopera-
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tion would give the states in the region-which are relatively politically impotent at the national level-a stronger bargaining power with
the larger and more powerful states outside the region.' ' '
STEPHEN C. M. LONG

111. An area for further research is the extension of this type of tax to other energy
resources. All energy resources have a common measure in BTUs. Perhaps through this type
of tax economic neutrality can be achieved among all energy resources.

